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1Abstract—Among the security issues in the environment of the Internet of things 
(IOT), the security of information source is a privilege to be concerned. To 
protect data collection and control devices in IOT, first of all, ones shall ensure 
the authenticity of information source. To address the uncertainty problem of 
information sources in IOT, identity authentication technology is essential. In 
this study, we suggested an enhanced bidirectional authentication scheme that is 
suitable for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) communications among 
devices or between devices and control devices in an IOT environment. Specific 
improvement measures included three aspects: back-up terminals, a condition 
monitoring device to increase authentication properties, and an alarm 
mechanism. The enhanced bidirectional authentication protocol presented in this 
article has the characteristics of excellent performance in security and privacy 
protection, which could authenticate data contents, even positions and other data 
properties, and resist the replay or denial of service attacks; at the same time, it 
could overcome the defect of data asynchrony between the front end and the 
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 back end, providing users with excellent forward security. The simulation 
experiments showed that system reliability was greatly enhanced by adopting the 
proposed protocol. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
With the increasing popularity of the Internet of things (IOT) concept and technology, 
the technical details of wireless sensor networks have been mastered by more and 
more people, and afterwards, more security issues have been exposed. To safeguard 
data collection and control devices in IOT, first of all, ones shall ensure the 
authenticity of information source, which requires the identity authentication 
mechanism of IOT control system to be more strict in comparison with traditional 
networks, so as to ensure the legality of access devices. By definition, IOT refers to a 
kind of network that associates things with the Internet for information interchange 
and communication to realize intelligent identification, location, tracking, monitoring, 
and management as appointed agreement by means of information sensing equipment 
[1]. In an IOT environment, terminal equipments mostly consist of intelligent 
terminals equipped with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) labels and 
identification terminals in charge of reading RFID label information, and a great 
number of data communications are transported by wireless sensor networks. At the 
early stage of wireless sensor network technology, the technology was widely used in 
the military field, so relatively fewer professionals could contact and understand the 
details of wireless sensor network technology, and relatively fewer security issues 
were exposed then. In addition, as a mass of RFID technologies having been applied 
to IOT, some people have already set various means of attacks upon the technical 
 vulnerability of RIFD, so that the information sources in an IOT environment are 
faced with severe security challenge [2]. 
     Compared with traditional computer networks, the architecture of IOT 
environment is more complex. The traditional computer networks exist only as a part 
of the network structure of IOT system, which leads to a cross-domain authentication 
problem of control security in an IOT environment. In addition, the variety and 
quantity of terminal devices of access networks increase greatly, and the terminal 
devices are no longer only PCs, servers and other similar computing devices in 
traditional computer networks, but also include intelligent terminals, RFID labels, 
reader-writers, wireless sensing nodes, short distance wireless communication 
terminals, mobile communication terminals, cameras, sensor network gateways, and a 
large number of other new-type devices. These devices not only present a great 
quantity, and diverse specifications and features which are difficult to be unified. At 
the same time, they are not provided with the high-performance operational capability 
like the traditional PCs, servers and other similar devices, so they can only adopt a 
relatively simple and efficient authentication algorithm, which greatly increases the 
difficulty of identity authentication in an IOT environment. Furthermore, because of 
the internal application features of IOT, the access devices of IOT are even more in 
the state of unattended operation compared with traditional computer networks, which 
makes the communications among devices out of artificial monitoring and protection. 
It therefore results in a great increase in difficulty of ensuring the security of 
information source in an IOT environment. 
 On the other hand, compared with mobile communication networks, the IOT terminal 
devices come with some problems, such as great man-made sabotage, illegal 
embezzlement, etc. As in mobile communication networks, the device terminals of 
 access networks such as mobile phone, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) are mostly 
provided for end users, and can be supervised and protected by users themselves. 
Network operators need not to monitor the security of terminal devices, and only need 
to ensure all terminal devices of access networks are legal. But in an IOT environment, 
as mass amounts of terminal devices are not privately owned by end users, and are 
kept in the unattended state in the long term, the devices are easily damaged 
artificially and physically, and their IDs can be embezzled for illegal access. Once an 
appropriator is able to access the operator network, there is likely to have destruction 
to networks or data embezzlement. Hence, with respect to traditional mobile 
communication networks, the authentication scheme for IOT devices shall be more 
strict to ensure the legality of access devices. 
To sum up, the uncertainty of information sources in an IOT environment mainly 
includes the following: 
(1) unauthorized use of terminal devices: the IOT terminal devices being mostly kept 
in the state of unattended operation, and easily destroyed artificially or robbed of 
communication modules in terminals for some illegal purposes, such as illegally 
embezzling for phone calls. 
(2) Illegally reading node information: attackers may execute destruction towards 
terminal devices in physics, so as to expose the non-open connectors of internal 
devices, and acquire session key, critical data and other information.  
(3) Pretending terminal devices or sensor nodes: attackers may pretend terminal 
devices or sensor nodes to access sensing networks by means of hardware or software, 
so as to monitor network information, catch data illegally, or send offensive and 
devastating information to the networks, and attack the whole network security. 
 (4) Device vulnerability: IOT Terminal devices are mostly RFID labels or wireless 
sensor nodes with sensory ability, and they just have limited operational capability in 
comparison with PC. So on one hand, it is difficult for them to burden high calculated 
quantity of security protocol and identity authentication algorithm; on the other hand, 
they are more easily cracked and attacked [3]. 
The purpose of identity authentication is to indeed verify identity each other, build up 
dependable communication relationship, and ensure the security and reliability of 
information sources. However, the devices in an IOT environment generally present 
the features of diverse specifications, jagged processing capacity, unattended 
operation and keeping motion, and these new features in an IOT environment raise 
new demands and challenges for identity authentication. Therefore, to solve the 
authenticity issue of information sources in an IOT environment, a new device 
identity authentication scheme that fits for the features of IOT shall be introduced to 
make legal identity authentication for the both sides of information interaction, and 
ensure the security of communications between information sources. Although some 
identity authentication schemes have been proposed against the terminal devices of 
IOT RFID in theory, a whole set of authentication model that fully complies with IOT 
environments and performs formal verification with a complete system is still 
unavailable. At the same time, the control system in an IOT environment also present 
some specificities. The terminal devices used for the control system usually perform a 
higher operational and storage capacity than those common RFID terminals, which 
provides guidance on designing an effective identity authentication scheme for the 
control system in an IOT environment. In this study, our efforts were made to balance 
resource, efficiency and security upon the features of the control system terminal 
devices, and select the identity authentication scheme that is best for its actual features. 
  
2. RELATED WORK 
A. Relevant research 
There are mainly two solutions for ensuring the identity legality and information 
source reliability of IOT terminal devices. One is the physical protection method for 
RFID devices, and the other is identity authentication based on cryptology.  
The identity authentication scheme using cryptology has a great superiority in security 
aspect, and there are some existing identity authentication protocols for IOT RFID 
devices, including the authentication protocols based on hash function: Hash-Lock 
protocol, random Hash-Lock protocol [4] and Hash-Chain protocol [5]; re-encryption 
protocols based on ID variation protocol and LCAP protocol.  
Hash-Lock protocol and random Hash-Lock protocol [6] were proposed by Weis and 
other researchers from American MIT. The comparison and authentication work is 
forwarded through hash function encryption with Hash-Lock protocol towards IOT 
device ID. Because of the stationarity of ID and hash function, this protocol leads to a 
fixed Hash value each time, which is tracked easily by attackers. Therefore, Weis et al 
further suggested a random Hash-Lock protocol on the basis of Hash-Lock protocol, 
and introduced a random number before Hash encryption towards ID to increase 
unpredictability of Hash value, which could effectively avoid trailing types of attack. 
But, this method leads to a significant increase in workload of searching and data 
communication traffic, and is not suitable for the IOT application system with a large 
number of labels. Afterwards, Japanese NTT lab proposed a Hash-Chain protocol 
based on two kinds of Hash-Lock protocols, and they reported that two times of 
encryption operations towards RFID with the help of the two different hash functions 
could provide stronger security. However, the protocol causes an increase in 
 calculating quantity of system, and 2n times of hash calculations and n times of 
comparisons and searches are necessary for the system with n RFID labels, which 
brings a great burden for IOT terminal devices with a limited operational capability.  
The hash-based ID variation protocol, proposed by Henrici, Muller et al, executes 
dynamic refreshing towards ID of each conversation, which effectively enhances the 
privacy of communications among RFID devices. But, this protocol has a hidden 
danger of out-of-step data at front and rear ends, and it is subject to out-of-step attacks. 
LCAP protocol [7] is an inquire-response type of protocol with the feature of 
bidirectional authentication, but still has the same problem as the hash-based ID 
variation protocol, i.e. it easily leads to out-of-step data at front and rear ends, and so 
it is unfit in the distributed computing environment. 
A famous re-encryption protocol [8] is the general re-encryption protocol scheme [9] 
capable of achieving RFID label anonymity function, proposed by Golle et al. The 
non-symmetric key encryption system is applied in this encryption scheme, and users 
can apply for a regular encryption rewriting of RFID label data, which helps to bring 
definite flexibility for IOT RFID device identity authentication.  
These protocols above can be simply classified as one-way authentication protocol 
and bidirectional authentication protocol in terms of the authentication direction. 
Therein, one-way authentication protocol includes three kinds of protocols based on 
hash function: Hash-Lock protocol, random Hash-Lock protocol, and Hash-Chain 
protocol. These one-way authentication protocols only complete authentication 
towards RFID device by card reader, and cannot achieve authentication towards card 
reader by RFID device. Such authentication model is forwarded on the premise that 
card reader, backstage server and database are fully credible. With one-way 
authentication model, RFID terminal devices cannot identify the legality of their 
 communication devices, and are likely to suffer controls by illegal card readers, 
leading to information disclosure [10]. That is to say that one-way authentication 
protocols have insufficient security.  
Although the ID variation protocol, LCAP protocol and re-encryption protocol on the 
basis of hash provide with definite features of bidirectional authentication, some 
deficiencies of other aspects still exist. As an example, the ID variation protocol and 
LCAP protocol [11] on the basis of hash could lead to the out-of-step information 
between terminal device of front end and backend database, so they are not 
appropriate for the authentication process of distributed computing environment. For 
re-encryption protocol [12], as its adopted ID is fixed and invariable, there exists with 
the severe problem of label location privacy leak, and the frequently repeated 
encryption operations bring a heavy burden for its practical application. In general, 
compared with one-way authentication, although a bidirectional authentication 
scheme results in an increase in costs, it still has strong security and is appropriate for 
the IOT control system with strict requirements in security performance [13]. 
Keunwoo Rhe et al from the Information Communication Security Lab of Korean 
Sungkyunkwan University proposed an RFID authentication protocol  on the basis of 
inquiry-response mode in the distributed environment of IOT [14]. This protocol 
solves most deficiencies of the authentication protocols above, and the bidirectional 
authentication method of inquiry-response mode used in this protocol makes the 
protocol more secure. At the same time, this protocol solves the out-of-step problem 
of data at front and rear ends. Thus, it can effectively avoid synchronous attacks, and 
is appropriate for the identity authentication in the environment of distributed 
database environment. As this protocol can also effectively resist replay attacks, 
spoofing attacks, position trailing, and flow analysis attacks which are common in 
 other hash authentication models, it is currently recognized as a relatively effective 
IOT RFID identity authentication protocol without any apparent security 
vulnerabilities. 
        
       B. The deficiency of previous authentication protocols   
    Although the RFID authentication protocol based on inquiry-repose mode is able to 
solve the typical identity authentication problems of RFID devices in an IOT 
environment, provided that it is directly applied in an IOT control system, some 
deficiencies still exist in this protocol: 
(1) Control system has a higher requirement for system reliability, and the terminal 
devices of control system often need backups. But in the identity authentication 
protocol suggested in literature [15], no information refers to identity authentication 
for backups of devices. 
(2) Under the special environment of IOT control system with a request for strong 
security, the method of completing identity authentication through the single property 
confirmation of device ID is still insufficient to satisfy the demands in security [16]. 
The identity authentication protocol in literature [17] only achieves the authentication 
towards device ID, and fails to put forward any other extensible authentication 
properties. 
(3) The protocol only describes the protocol process under the circumstance of 
passing authentication normally, but a complete design in case of an authentication 
failure is not available. When a device fails to pass authentication, the device is likely 
to suffer an illegal attack, and the system shall be informed of follow-up and 
renovation, but the protocol does not provide any relevant alarming measures [18]. 
Hence, how to design an effective and feasible identity authentication model with 
 strong security for a combination of the terminal devices in an IOT environment, 
especially the terminal device features of IOT control system, is the objective of this 
study. 
 
3. ENHANCED BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
 A. Improvement measures 
    Specific improvement measures include the following three aspects: 
    (1) Introduce back-up terminals: An alternate device is added for each device of 
access control system, and the alternate device provides with the same functions and 
communication capacities with the master device, but different ID. When the master 
device works normally, the alternate device is kept in a hot standby state. When the 
mater device cannot pass identity authentication resulting from breaking down or 
suffering attacks, the alternate device takes the place of the mater device at any time 
to pass identity authentication and complete follow-up work. In the new 
authentication protocol, some necessary improvements are made, i.e. when the master 
device fails to pass identity authentication due to some special reasons, the backend 
database sends incorrect signals to identification reader equipment, and the 
identification reader equipment will make hot switch to stop communications with the 
faulted terminals and start the alternate device, as well as sending authentication 
request to the alternate device. 
    (2) Introduce a condition monitoring device to increase authentication properties: A 
condition monitoring device is added for terminal devices, to monitor the operation 
state of terminal devices when receiving the request of identity authentication such as 
rated voltage, transmission frequency, communication rate, etc, acquire status 
information and send to identification reader equipment, and act as the determination 
 property with encrypted device ID. The introduction of this mechanism not only 
enhances authentication security, but also can effectively detect whether terminal 
devices suffer functional damages, which helps to avoid the occurrence that the 
damaged devices can pass identity authentication, but cannot work properly. In 
addition, the condition monitoring device is equipped with the hot function for 
switching and linking with an alternate device when the master device breaks down. 
(3) Introduce an alarm mechanism: If a device fails to pass identity authentication and 
causes mistakes, the system alarm mechanism is introduced to send information to 
alarm module backstage and inform of alarm type. The designed alarm type here 
include four categories, and are master device ID information mismatching, alternate 
device ID information mismatching, master device ID information matching but status 
information mismatching, and alternate device ID information matching but status 
information mismatching, respectively. 
 
B. Authentication process 
The enhanced bidirectional authentication process towards IOT control system 
contains the following five steps: 
Step 0. Initialization: Each RFID terminal device that accesses to the IOT control 
system is provided with the sole device ID in the world, and the ID is preserved into 
the terminal device itself and backend distributed database. In addition, the normal 
operation state parameters of each terminal device are also preserved in backend 
database for comparison of state parameters in authentication process. Before 
identification reader equipment sends an authentication request, both the terminal 
master device and the alternate device are kept in hot standby state, and the condition 
monitoring device is linked to the master device. 
 Step 1. Master device authentication: 
a. The identification reader equipment sends the request of identity authentication to 
the terminal master device and the condition monitoring device, and then sends the 
generated random numbers to the terminal master device; 
b. Condition monitoring device starts to acquire the operation state information of 
terminal master device, encrypts the information by hash function, and sends the 
encrypted status information to identification reader equipment; 
c. Terminal master device generates a new random number, and cascades its own ID 
and the two random numbers for encryption by hash function, and then sends the 
encrypted ID authentication data to the identification reader equipment; 
d. The identification reader equipment sends the received information of encryption 
state, encrypted ID authentication data and the two random numbers to backend 
database system; 
e. For all the preserved device information in backend database, its ID and the two 
random numbers, as well as normal operation status information of the device are 
cascaded for hash, to be compared with the received encryption ID authentication data 
and encryption status information: 
e.1 If the two groups of information obtained are matched, the authentication process 
towards backend terminal device finishes. The server then executes hash for the 
device ID and the random number generated by terminal device, and send them to the 
identification reader equipment, switching to Step f; 
e.2 If the two groups of information obtained are not matched, the authentication fails, 
then turning to Step 2; 
f. After the identification reader equipment receives the hash data from backend, it 
sends the data to terminal devices; 
 g. After terminal devices receive the hash data from the identification reader 
equipment, they cascade their own ID and the generated random numbers for hash 
and compare with the received data. If the matching succeeds, the authentication 
process towards backend devices by terminal devices has passed, and then the whole 
bidirectional authentication process has completed. 
Step 2. The first time of alarming: When the authentication process is forwarded to 
Step 1 e.2, the authentication fails, and the first time of alarming by system starts on. 
When backend data fail to find out the devices matched with encrypted ID 
authentication information, it means the identity of terminal device is illegal, and the 
system will send alarming information 1 to alarming module, which indicates the 
illegal identity of master device; when backend data successfully find the devices 
matched with encrypted ID authentication information, but the status information of 
encrypted devices cannot be well matched, it means the identity of terminal device is 
legal but its operating state is incorrect. Maybe it has suffered physical damage, then 
the system will send alarming information 2 to alarming module, which indicates the 
incorrect operating status of master device. 
Step 3. Device switching, and alternate device authentication: After the system sends 
the first time of alarming, backend database sends a device switching signal to the 
identification reader equipment. Next, the identification reader equipment sends a 
device switching request to the condition monitoring device, and sends a identity 
authentication request and random numbers to the alternate terminal device. After the 
identification reader equipment receives the device switching request, it immediately 
breaks the links with the master device and builds links with the alternate device. 
Until this step, the switching process of master alternate device has completed, and 
the follow-up authentication steps are the same as Step 1. 
 Step 4. The second time of alarming: When the authentication process towards 
alternate device is forwarded to Step 1 e.2, the authentication fails, and the second 
time of alarming by the system starts on. When backend data fail to find out the 
devices matched with encrypted ID authentication information, it means the identity 
of terminal device is illegal, and the system will send alarming information 3 to 
alarming module, which indicates the illegal identity of master device; when backend 
data successfully find the devices matched with encrypted ID authentication 
information, but the status information of encrypted devices cannot be well matched, 
it means the identity of terminal device is legal but its operating state is incorrect. It 
could have suffered physical damage, then the system will send alarming information 
4 to alarming module, which indicates the incorrect operating status of master device. 
 
4. FORMALIZED DEFINITION 
This section describes the formalized definition on some key words used in the 
proposed authentication process.  
Reader: Identification reader equipment; 
TDmain: It is the main terminal equipment that is joined up in    the control system and 
provided with RFID label; 
TDbackup: It is the back-up terminal equipment that is joined up in the control system 
and provided with RFID label; 
TDchecker: It is the equipment that checks the running status of the terminal equipment. 
ID: The ID of the terminal equipment. 
Statuslnfo: The operating status information of the terminal equipment; 
Reader: The random number generated by the identification reader equipment; 
Rtd: The random number generated by the terminal equipment; 
 Requestid: The identity authentication requests that the identification reader equipment 
sends to the terminal equipment and status monitoring equipment; 
Requestswitch: Requests to switch equipment; 
BackendDB: Backend database system; 
AlarmingModule: System alarming module; 
HashID(…): The hash function is used to encrypt ID information of equipment. 
Information in the bracket is the data being encrypted;  
Hashst(...): The hash function is used to encrypt the operating status information of 
equipment. Information in the bracket is the data being encrypted; 
A      B:…: It is the data transmitting procedure, indicating that equipment A sends 
information to equipment B. Following the colon are the information contents;  
A      B:...: It is the data acquisition procedure, indicating that equipment A acquires 
information from equipment B. Following the colon are the information contents; 
||: Cascade operator;  
; The comparison of being equal or not;  
Alarmingi: i=l,2,3,4,: It indicates four pieces of system alarming information.  
A.  Authentication model 
The mode of enhanced bidirectional authentication scheme is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
The above Steps 1 to 10 are the model under the condition that the first 
authentication is approved. Therein, x=main, namely the terminal equipment is the 
main equipment. The authentication process for the approved first authentication is 
shown in Figure 1. Note: the picture only describes the data transmitting process, and 
no calculation and judge process are described. Thus the serial numbers differ from 
the above-mentioned formalized description. 
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Fig.1. Identity authentication process: the first authentication is approved 
 
When the authentication comes to Step 8, unapproved authentication may occur. 
Following is the description for the model under the condition that the first 
authentication is unapproved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above is the model under the condition that the first authentication is unapproved but 
the second authentication is approved after the equipment is switched. In such case, 
the authentication process is shown in Figure 2. It starts from the alarming signal of 
system upon the disapproval of first authentication. 
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Fig.2. Identity authentication process: the second authentication is approved 
 
When it proceeds to Step 8 and the second authentication fails to be approved again, 
the model is described as follows:  
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 The authentication process is shown in Figure 3, it starts from the alarming signal of 
system upon the disapproval of first authentication. 
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Fig.3. Identity authentication process: the second authentication is not approved 
 
          5. AUTHENTICATION MODEL EXTENSION 
   The existing RFID authentication protocol presented in literature [19] is applicable 
to an IOT distributed environment, and is on the basis of inquiry-response, which puts 
forward the bidirectional authentication methods between the IOT control system 
collecting points and backend combined with some specific security requirements of 
IOT control system.  
In the actual IOT collecting terminal communications environment, to ensure the 
authenticity of the communication source, some other properties in addition to the 
legitimacy of the identity of both sides often have to be considered, mainly including 
the location information of collection points and the judgment on the contents of the 
control instruction itself. Because of the relevance between data collection work in 
data collection points and their positions, the position information has a vital 
 significance to the authenticity of terminal communication source as its identity 
information does. The attacker could disguise itself as a collection point with 
legitimate identity and send data to the back-end system from different locations, 
which results in attack or sabotage. On the other hand, once the position of the 
collection points with legitimate identity has changed, the collected data themselves 
would lose practical significance. Therefore, only when both legitimate identity and 
correct position are guaranteed, the data information transferred from collection 
points can be real and effective.  
For the back-end control terminals, in addition to ensuring the legitimacy of their 
identity, the correctness of control commands sent by the back-end control terminals 
should be ensured. Control terminals with legal identity are likely to result in the 
destruction of the system due to the wrong control command. For example, in the 
event that malicious control commands in addition to normal control ones are sent, or 
the normal commands whose contents are within the normal scope are frequently sent, 
it would result in cumulative error or control failure. Therefore, only the authenticity 
and validity of three factors, identity, location and contents, are guaranteed, the source 
security of system can obtain the greatest assurance.  
Based on the above analysis, and on the basis of guaranteeing the authenticity of the 
communication source, namely the legitimate identity of both the sides of 
communications, the bidirectional authentication schemes previously proposed can be 
extended, and  the authentication of collection points’ location information and the 
judgment mechanism for the control command contents of the back-end control side 
can be added so as to further ensure the security of communication process and the 
effectiveness of communication contents. The recognition authentication of collection 
points’ location information can be preceded with the identity authentication at the 
 same time, and the location information can be part of the authentication contents. 
One possible scheme is that proceeding the monitoring of collection points’ location 
information and the test of its operational status, or implementing the monitoring of 
collection points’ location information as part of the status information. 
The judgment on the control command contents of the back-end control site can be 
carried out after the authentication has completed, and control instructions are sent to 
collection points by the back-end through the identification reader equipment, and 
then the collection points determine the legality of the control commands, thus 
performing actions based on the results. One possible implementation is to restore 
legitimate control instruction lists in the terminal collection points so as to verdict the 
received control commands. In the event that the control command is within the 
legitimate scope of the commands, the instruction will be executed; otherwise, it will 
not be implemented. In addition, the threshold value of repeated reception frequency 
for specific legitimate commands can be set. When the command is repeatedly and 
continuously sent, and the frequency exceeds the threshold value, the collection points 
in the terminal will stop receiving the corresponding instructions. The diagram of the 
safety certification process based on this idea is shown in Figure 4. 
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Fig.4. The extended secure authentication process 
 
        6. EVALUATION AND SIMULATION 
    The data setting of simulation environment is first described in this section. 
The simulation environment consists of two terminal RFID devices. The ID uses the 
EPC-96 coding scheme [20], and the IDs of the two devices are set as follows: 
IDmain      02 0003458 00018F 000156DC0 
                IDbackup    02 0003458 00018F 000156DC1 
The terminal equipment and the identification reader equipment generate random 
numbers, respectively, and the format is 8 bit binary code. The status information of 
terminal equipment is 32 bit binary code. The default status information is as follows:  
StatusInfo               IA300E0D 
MD5 encryption algorithm is used to encrypt ID and the Hash encryption of random 
numbers, and SHA1 encryption algorithm is utilized to encrypt the status information 
of terminal equipment and the Hash encryption of random numbers. In practical 
operation, all the data should be encrypted in the form of hexadecimal character string.  
A. Simulation scenario 1 
 The first authentication is approved. The Reader sends the Requestid signal to TD 
checker and generates a random number 01101111(6F) in the meantime. Reader sends 
Requestw signal to main terminal equipment TDmain and the random number lUder. 
The main terminal equipment TDmain generates a random number Rto 01110110(76) 
upon the reception of the data, and cascades its ID and two random numbers, so that 
the following is obtained:  
4AD5F561449978577C7FD15C3D0806B1DE3509AD 
Then MD5 encryption algorithm is used to proceed Hash encryption, obtaining 32 bit 
encrypted character string: 
358216D96314FEE7A0F53B46D853206F 
The main terminal equipment sends this character string and Rtd to the Reader. 
Meanwhile, TDchecker acquires the status information of main terminal equipment 
TDmain StatusInfo  IA300E0D. And then SHA1 encryption algorithm is used to 
proceed Hash encryption, yielding 40 bit encrypted character string: 
FFBDC2A6B552A3A24CC47FD64BBBD5E4A929A5ER 
TDchecker sends the encrypted character string to the Reader. The Reader sends the two 
random numbers and two groups of encrypted character strings to the back-end 
database Backend DB. The Backend DB cascades all the stored ID information one 
by one and proceeds Hash operation, as well as compares them with received ID 
encrypted characters to find the matching value. Also, it proceeds SHA1 Hash 
operation on the StatusMo information corresponding to this ID, and compares them 
with the received Statuslnfo encrypted character string. After the comparison and 
matching, the back-end database cascades the matched ID and Rtd, then the following 
is obtained: 
0233448956FDCE7845890 
 MD5 encryption algorithm is used to proceed on this character string, resulting in 32 
bit encrypted character string: 
DA3E5BA0BDC060E3881F864B33616903 
The back-end database sends the encrypted character string to the Reader, and the 
Reader sends the received character string to the main terminal equipment TDmain. 
The TDmain cascades its ID and the random number Rtd generated by itself, and 
proceeds Hash operation, thus obtains the following 32 bit encrypted character string: 
DA3E5BA0BDC060E3881F864B33616903 
This character string is compared with the received encrypted character string. If the 
match is successful, the whole authentication process is completed successfully.  
B. Simulation scenario 2 
The first authentication is unapproved, and the system gives alarming for the first time, 
but the second authentication is approved. The main terminal equipment suffers a 
replay attack. In the previous authentication process, it is 01001001(89) and the Rtd is 
10110110(B6). The attacker eavesdrops the encrypted ID character string 
E08A4B78D706D0E867C4A3790A34F436 and Rtd 10110110(B6) sent to the Reader 
(old) by the main terminal. In the next authentication, the Reader generates a random 
number Reader  01001001(89), and sends Requestid signal and random numbers to 
TDmain, and sends Requestid signal to TDcheckCT as well. This time the attacker 
sends the encrypted ID character string 6855267DF61E69E8ABB6797D74EF42B3 
and Rtd 10110110(B6) intercepted and captured in the previous authentication 
process to pretend the normal terminal equipment. Meanwhile, TDchecker sends the 40 
bit encrypted character string 
5A61498D5DDD98AAE0D9676891858A3AA1B77C1E 
 to the reader after encrypting the status information of the real terminal equipment. 
Afterwards, the Reader sends RreadeP Rtd and two encrypted character strings to the 
Backend DB. The Backend DB cascades all the stored ID information with Rtd one 
by one and proceeds Hash operation, as well as compares them with received ID 
encrypted character string BCC9CB4FB13456ED8B571E2D4BB273F5. 
If Rreader(old) ≠ Rreader, the system fails to find the matching value. At this time, 
the Backend DB sends the class 1 alarming signal to AlarmingModule, and sends 
Requestswitch to the Reader. The Reader then sends the Requestswitch to the TDcheck, and 
starts a new round identity authentication with TDbackup. 
The Reader generates a random number Rreader’ 11000111(C7), and sends the 
Requestid signal and the random number to TD back-up terminal equipment TDbackup. 
The TDbackup generates the random number Rtd’ 01110111(77) upon the reception of 
the data, and cascades its IDbackup and two random numbers, so that the following is 
obtained:  
013333A8900016F000169DC1E737 
Then MD5 encryption algorithm is used to proceed Hash encryption, obtaining 32 bit 
encrypted character string: 
FA573DACE6514BB74A1B6BCDFGHJ0E47 
The TDbackup sends this character string and Rtd’ to the Reader. Meanwhile, TDchecker 
acquires the status information of TDbackup IA300E0D. And SHA1 encryption 
algorithm is used to proceed Hash encryption, resulting in 40 bit encrypted character 
string: 
FFBDC2A6B552A3A24CC47FD64BBBD5E4A929A5TD 
The TDchecker sends the encrypted character string to the Reader. The Reader sends the 
two random numbers and two groups of encrypted character strings to the back-end 
 database Backend DB. The Backend DB cascades all the stored ID information one 
by one and proceeds MD5 Hash operation, as well as compares them with received ID 
encrypted character to find the matching value. Also, SHA1 Hash operation is 
performed on the StatusInfo corresponding to this ID, which is compared with the 
received Statuslnfo encrypted character string. After the comparison and matching, 
the back-end database Backend DB cascades the matched ID and Rtd, then the 
following is obtained: 
016666A8900016F000169DC148 
MD5 encryption algorithm is used to proceed this character string, obtaining 32 bit 
encrypted character string: 
BF95C1E11F21298D6B701C77777F1996 
The back-end database sends the encrypted character string to the Reader, and the 
Reader sends the received character string to the back-up terminal equipment TDbackup. 
The TDbackup cascades its IDbackup and the random number Rtd generated by itself, and 
proceeds Hash operation, thus obtains the following 32 bit encrypted character string: 
BF95C1E11F21298D6B701C77777F1996 
This character string is compared with the received encrypted character string. If the 
match is successful, the whole authentication process is completed successfully.  
C. Simulation scenario 3 
The first authentication is unapproved, and the system then gives class 2 alarming. 
When the second authentication is unapproved, the system gives class 3 alarming. It 
simulates that the main terminal equipment suffers physical damage and the back-up 
terminal equipment suffers a spoofing attack. The Reader sends the Requestid signal to 
TDchecker and generates the random number Rreader 01111010(7A) in the meantime. It 
then sends Requestid signal and random number Rreader to main terminal equipment 
 TDmain. The main terminal equipment TDmain generates the random number RTD 
11110011 (F3) upon the reception of the data, and cascades its ID and two random 
numbers, so that the following is obtained:  
01OOOOA8900016F000729DC05AF1 
MD5 encryption algorithm is then used to proceed Hash encryption, obtaining 32 bit 
encrypted character string: 
704E281FEC9E2DD4FC33 51DF364B01F2 
The main terminal equipment sends this character string and Rtd to the Reader. 
Meanwhile, TDchecker acquires the status information of main terminal equipment 
TDmain. The TDmain suffers physical damage, thus an error occurs in its operation 
status. The value of operation information acquired by TDchecker is 1A5AC2B0, and 
then SHA1 encryption algorithm is used to proceed Hash encryption, obtaining 40 bit 
encrypted character string: 
C3D6639DCB0482068859B9650E51DD485F8A7AAB 
TDchecker sends the encrypted character string to the Reader. The Reader sends the two 
random numbers and two groups of encrypted character strings to the back-end 
database Backend DB. The Backend DB cascades all the stored ID data one by one 
and proceeds Hash operation, and compares them with received ID encrypted 
characters to find the matching value. Also, SHA1 Hash operation is performed on the 
Statuslnfo corresponding to this ID, which is compared with the received Statuslnfo 
encrypted character string. However, the operation status information of TDmain is 
inconsistent with the default status information, so the Statuslnfo encrypted character 
string corresponding to the matched ID is not matched with the received Statuslnfo 
encrypted character string. At this time, the Backend DB sends the class 2 alarming 
signal to AlarmingModule, and sends Requestswitch to the Reader. The Reader then 
 sends Requestswitch to TDcheck, and starts a new round identity authentication with 
TDbackup. In the previous authentication process for TDbackup, the attacker pretended 
the Reader to send Requestid and Rreader(fake) 01111111(7E) to TDbackup, and 
received the ID encrypted character string 
5BA8BE38AA08C88AEC0A4833348D9CD0 and  Rtd’ 11000011(C3) sent back by 
TDbackup. 
In the event that authentication for the main terminal equipment fails again this time, 
it switches to the back-up terminal equipment TDbackup again. When the reader sends 
Requestid and Rread’ 00101001 (2B) to TDbackup, the attacker sends the encrypted ID 
character string 3AB8BE38CCC8C88AEC0A4833328D9CD0 and Rtd’  
11010011(D3) intercepted and captured to pretend a normal terminal device. 
Meanwhile, TDchecker sends the 40 bit encrypted character string 
7645498D5CCC98AAE0D9676891858A3BB1C77C1E to the reader after encrypting 
the status information of the real terminal equipment. Afterwards, the Reader sends 
RreadeP Rtd and two encrypted character strings to the Backend DB. The Backend 
DB cascades all the stored ID data with Rreader’ and Rtd’ one by one and performs 
Hash operation, as well as compares them with received ID encrypted character string 
4AB8BE38DD08C88AEC0A4811128D9CD.  
If Rreader(fake) ≠ Rreader’, the system fails to find the matching value. At this time, 
the Backend DB sends the class 3 alarming signal to AlarmingModule. So far the 
whole authentication process is over, and it fails.  
D. Simulation scenario 4  
The first authentication is unapproved, and the system gives class 1 alarming. When 
the second authentication is unapproved, the system gives class 4 alarming. It 
simulates that the main terminal equipment suffers a replay attack and the back-up 
 terminal equipment suffers physical damage. In the previous authentication process, 
the Rreader(old) is 00111100(3C) and the Rtd is ! 0101011 (AB). The attacker 
eavesdrops the encrypted ID character string 
FD2273576AF588AADF58B0384586FD48 and Rtd lOlOlOll(AB) sent to the Reader 
by the main terminal. 
In the next authentication, the Reader generates a random number Rreato 
10110101(85), and sends Requestid signal and random numbers to TDmain, and sends 
Requestid signal to TDchecker as well. At this time, the attacker sends the encrypted ID 
character string FD2273576AF588AADF58B0384586FD48 and Rtd lOlOlOll(AB) 
intercepted and captured in the previous authentication process to pretend a normal 
terminal device. Meanwhile, TDchecker sends the 40 bit encrypted character string 
A61498D5CCC98AAE0D9676891858A3AA1B77C1E to the reader after encrypting 
the status information of the real terminal equipment. Afterwards, the Reader sends 
RreadeP Rtd and two encrypted character strings to the Backend DB. The Backend 
DB cascades all the stored ID data with Rtd one by one and performs Hash operation, 
as well as compares them with received ID encrypted character string 
FD2273576AF588AADF58B0384586FD4.  
If Rreader(old) ≠ Rreader, the system fails to find the matching value. At this time, 
the Backend DB sends the class 1 alarming Alarming1 signal to AlarmingModule, 
and sends Requestswitch to the Reader. The Reader then sends the Requestswitch to 
TDcheck, and starts a new round identity authentication with TDbackup. The Reader 
generates random number Rreader’ 10011111(9F), and sends the Requestid signal and 
the random number to back-up terminal equipment TDbackup. TDbackup generates the 
random number Rtd’ 111O1OO1(EB) upon the reception of the data, and cascades its 
ID and two random numbers, so that the following is obtained:  
 010000A8900016F000169DC19FEB 
MD5 encryption algorithm is then used to perform Hash encryption, obtaining 32 bit 
encrypted character string: 
42A7E6F1EE451BA1006706C93E869A39 
TDbackup sends this character string and Rtd’ to the Reader. Meanwhile, TDChecker 
acquires the status information of TDbackup. TDbackup suffers physical damage, thus an 
error occurs in its operation status. The value of operation information acquired by 
TDchecker is 1AEB1026, and SHA1 encryption algorithm is then used to perform Hash 
encryption, obtaining 40 bit encrypted character string: 
F97A9CB86CA5C032B8933EDECD4FEF38C801726F 
TDchecker sends the encrypted character string to the Reader. The Reader sends the two 
random numbers and two groups of encrypted character strings to the back-end 
database Backend DB. The Backend DB cascades all the stored ID data one by one 
and performs MD5 Hash operation, as well as compares them with received ID 
encrypted character to find the matching value. Also, SHA1 Hash operation is 
performed on the StatusInfo corresponding to this ID, which is compared with the 
received Statuslnfo encrypted character string.   
    However, the operation status information of TDbackup is inconsistent with the 
default status information, so the Statuslnfo encrypted character string corresponding 
to the matched ID is not matched with the received Statuslnfo encrypted character 
string. At this time, the Backend DB sends the class 4 alarming signal to Alarming 
Module, and sends Request switch to the Reader. So far the whole authentication 
process is over with failure.  
 
 7. CONCLUSION  
This paper proposes an enhanced bidirectional identity authentication protocol for 
RFID communications in IOT with good security and privacy protection. The 
proposed authentication protocol can verify data content even position, resist replay 
attacks and denial of service attacks, and achieve the data synchronization between 
the front and rear ends with good forward security. The improved authentication 
protocol not only improves the reliability, but also effectively resists most security 
threats; it is a feasible RFID security authentication protocol. In addition, in the aspect 
of hardware complexity, the system needs not to add an additional encryption circuit 
in the terminal hardware, i.e. low dependence on hardware. This scheme can meet the 
design requirements of IOT in three aspects: security, efficiency and cost. It is a kind 
of identity authentication scheme which is suitable for IOT. 
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